The aim of this book' review is to offer a critical analysis to the key assumptions and themes presented by the author where the positive contribution as well as points of contention have been highlighted. The key theme of this book focuses on notion that in the Middle East, unlike Europe, wars didn't make states but they destroyed them and they ended up as a hollow shell. This theme has been applied on different case studies in Arab World mainly Jordan, Iraq and UAE. The analytical review has discussed and analyzed author's arguments, methodology, systemization and demonstration, the theoretical and conceptual reflections on state and statehood as well as patterns of comparison between early modern European state and current Arab state. Eventually/ the review has concluded with offering alternative approaches in dealing with Arab states.
INTRODUCTION
War and state making in the Middle East, written by (Dr. Rolf Schwarz) who is a professor at Nato defence college in Rome-Italy have conducted extensive reserach in the field of strategic studies and middle eastern studies. This book offers an important academic study relating to the nature of the state and the conditions of its formation, erosion and failure in the Arab world. Moreover, its importance stems from the fact that it has been published soon after the beginning of the Arab spring and its subsequen regional and domestic political transformations, it is nevertheless based on a seven-year empirically founded reflection. Furthermore, it provides several keys of analysis for the recent political history of the Arab states which emerged after the independence, as well as elements of prospective regarding their near political future. In addition to that it is a valuable contribution made by the author in the on going debate about the state making, buliding and consildation in the Middle East which could be of great help to the students as well as resrachers in the field of Middle Eastern Studies.
Despite the abovementioned stimmulating academic contribtions of this book, a review with a critical analysis to they key assumptions of this book is of essential importance as it could bring another reading to its subject matter.
Thesis and Arguments.
The author aims to investigate the main variables that impacte the Arab states' political structure, functionality and efficiency. "The book is not a chronological history of state making in the Middle East, but rather an analytical account of the dynamics and trajectories of the consolidation of states in the Arab world since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" (p.1). Many classical approaches related to state making have focused on the constitutive effect of wars on the emergence of modern states (Tilly, 1985, pp.170-186) . Chief amomg those approaches is Charles Tilly's leading perspectuive of the formation and consolidation of centralized states through warfare in early modern Europe. (Brubaker, 2010, pp.375-381) . This theortical; perspective has been extensively mobilized for the analysis of modern statehood, as well as for the logics of past and present conflicts. This view led some researchers to recommend "to give war a chance" for achieving peace and state consolidation (Edward N., 1999, pp. 36-84) .
Schwarz' theme stems from the paradox that despite the high level of intrastate and interstate conflicts in the Arab world since the 1930s, no state could emerge in the region as a strong and efficient one. "In the Middle East, unlike in Europe, wars did not make states -they destroyed them " (p.3), and "the state remains a hollow shell" (p.8). He argued that the modern state's key functions -welfare, security and representativity (p.1) -are not convincigly fulfilled in the Arab world. The author has pointed out that in the absence of a substantial level of domestic taxation to fund their wars, due to alternative and external financial sources, rentier states have failed in making the Tillian mechanism " War makes State" effective. In the Arab world, "where military capacity has been paid for rulers' rent and where war making has been employed as a strategy of state building, this had effects dramatically opposed to those of the ruler-subject struggles that characterized early modern Europe" (p.2). The author suggests that state making depends on the state's ability and legitimacy to tax its population so to wage war which supsequantly would lead to the establishment of a rational and efficient bureaucracy and, more importantly, to establish a tacit social contract between rulers and citizens. "Rentierism serves as an obstacle to the formation of strong states that legitimately represent their citizens and leads to institutionally weak states which lack political accountability" (p.2). Therefore, he focuses on "the interplay between external rents, war, and the adjustments of social contracts" in the consolidation or erosion of state, linking " the way in which rulers acquire their means to rule with the quality of that rule " (p.7).
The case studies he selected (Iraq, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates), which according to him are representative of the whole region's political sociology, enabled him to refine his arguments and to conclude that "(f)irst, rentierism serves as an obstacle to the formation of strong and legitimate states, since stability rests on a social contract by means of which consent is bought via material welfare; (...) Second, an even more novel point, rentierism not only inhibits the emergence of embedded domestic authority structures and empirical sovereignty, but it also acts against the disappearance of weak and fragile states" (p.13).
Schwarz does not restrict his understanding of rentierism to oil or gas revenue, but to any external source of revenue that is not linked with internal taxation or the development of a domestic productive activity.Therefore, he has included in his analysis the states that get most of their revenue from migrants' remittances, transit fees or foreign aid for instance. The spectrum of rentierism in the Arab world allegedly goes from semi-rentier states (Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon) to rentier ones (all the other Arab states). This enables the author to justify and cement his construction of the Arab world as a valid analytical category, referred to it as Arab Middle East. The author emphisised that this label is used "in a political rather than geographical sense » and « includes not only Middle East proper (...) but also the North African states" (p.121).
Methodology.
The author has adopted a double comparative perspective. First, a historical one, by comparing the process of state making in early modern Europe to the current one in the Arab world; second, a regional one, by comparing the Arab states from Morocco to the Gulf states.
The auother has focused on Iraq, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, which constitue extensive separate case studies in three distinct chapters. They are presented as being illustrative of the processes of state making in the whole Arab world, "painting a rather gloomy picture of the entire region" (p.8). These case studies have been selected because they are considered to have received little attention in the literature focusing on rentierism and state making, contrary to other Arab states. Despite some differences in their characteristics and functioning, resulting from a variation in the way and intensity in which they used or not war as a means to consolidate their regime, Schwarz has reached to the conclusion that " in all the three states, legitimacy is lacking and the state remains a hollow shell" (p.8). However, Jordan is analysed more specifically as a " weak state" and Iraq as a failed one, although they have both experienced war, whereas the UAE is approached as a rather efficient state, despite no past experience of war making.
3. Critical Analysis of the Book.
Systemization and Demonstration:
Several points presented in the book are stimulating for any reflection concerning the political sociology of the Arab states. The first valuable element is the author's attempt to build a theortical perspective explaining the character of the state's political and institutional functioning that would encompass the whole region. To -930 -achieve this, the author has employed substantial data and figures articulated to a wide range of comparative parameters, which are sytemized in numerous tables. In that, he has stressed common features and differences between states, highlighting and testing possible relevant variables. This provides an extensive empirical basis for the reflection, as well as a clear schematization of the author's leading arguments.
The three case studies Iraq (Chapter 2), Jordan (Chapter 3) and the UAE (Chapter 4) provide another useful extensive empirical background. They propose detailed political, societal and geostrategic history for each state. This embeds the complex state making process in its broader but particular cultural, sociological and anthropological context. The author acknowledges indeed the importance of local cultures as a factor explaining the differences in the paths followed by the states, calling for differentiated approaches to state making. " Different pathways to state making depend not only on divergent historical settings, but also on different spatial contexts. With particular reference to the Middle East, a focus on societal and cultural inderstanding and how they determine different contexts in which such factors as war making extraction repression and state institutions operate, is paramount" (p.25). However, the author's acceptance of the notion of culture and his assumption of how it interacts with political and institutional functioning is somehow problemtic, limiting then the question relating to that variable. " Far from assuming culturalist determinism, and rather in line with Weber, I see people's behaviour as being linked with interests and motives and these in turn as being expressed in terms of values and cultures. The incorporation of culture into the analysis of state building processes should not be seen as a factor by itself, but rather a result of material conditions (identities being forged by states) and the context in which state building occurs" (p.25). Assuming that identities are a result of state production and activity is totally relevant, but considering that side exclusively does not account for the phase preceding the state formation, which is also essential in understanding how it emerges (Halliday, 2005, pp.1-30) .
It neither takes into consideration the cultural phenomena and configurations that also occur outside or independently from the state. Finally, understanding culture merely in terms of interests and motives may not catch all the unconscious norm circulation phenomena resulting from interactive processes which contribute to change people's world view. At least, a more extensive justification and definition of the notion of culture mobilized would have been helpfull. Regarding the cultural dimension of state making, Halliday may provide a complementary insight on how and why political cultures vary through history and between states, having a deep impact on the states functioning and configuration. He view culture as a very deep, very long-term and to a certain extent unconscious force within societies, which constraints people's world views and approaches of identity and politics beyond classic and rational interests (Halliday, 2005, pp.1-30) .
One may notice also a few dubbious categorizations in this systemization attempt, part of them due to blur patterns of comparison between states, or to have intrinsec assessment. This leads sometimes to some suprising categorizations, such as putting together a very wide variety of states despite their obvious differences in terms of efficiency. For example, a striking statement brings together Algeria and Somalia in the same diagnosis of failure (not precising if the notion of failure was refering to weak, failing of failed state, which thus weakens the categorisation and comparison) "examples of state failure in the wider Middle Eastern region include Algeria, Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, and now Libya" (p.23). In the same vein, the distinctive conclusions regarding the Gulf States, and the rest of the Arab world, lack sometimes clarity. For example, Gulf coutnries, and especially the case study of the UAE, are first presented as states which are characterized by failure: "Rentierism serves as an obstacle to the formation of strong states that legitimately represent their citizens and leads to institutionally weak states which lack political accountability" (p.2); referring to the three case studies, he concludes that in the three configurations, "the state remains a hollow shell" (p.8). However, in other parts of the book, and especially in the chapter dedicated to the specific case study, he concludes that « rentierism has consolidated states in the absence of war making and has produced stable regimes and embedded authority structures » (referring to the UAE, and, more broadly, to the Gulf states).
3.2.Theortical and Conceptual Refelctions on the State and Statehood.
A second key dimension of the book is the substantial theoretical and conceptual reflection it provides on state and statehood. After a general introduction specifying the book's main thesis and aims, the first chapter is dedicated to this conceptual and theoretical enterprise. It constitutes a fine, clear and hugely referenced the issues connected to state making and state functioning. It is particularly valuable for political science students and policy-makers who would like to grasp the logics and challenges of political science academic debates relating to the state. The chapter is also essential as it assesses the main concepts and theoretical frameworks within or against which the author's argument will be founded. The author questions more broadly the current challenges to the state in the contemporary globalized system, the different possible theoretical conceptions to assess the state's nature and functioning, as well as the evolutive and transformational processes it has been through from the modern era to current time. He refutes the relevance of static and ideal-typical views of the state, which according to him still condition heavily the way in which researchers and policy-makers deal with the state. "Much scholarship has taken Max Weber's ideal type, which sees the state as given, and has failed to deal with other forms of statehood" (p.18). He underlines the relevance of alternative conceptions of the state, particularly the " natural " state one, which considers more carefully the variations in the functioning of the modern state according to the empirical reality from which it emerges, in which it evolves, to which it adapts, but which it transforms too. According to this view, the Weberian ideal-types are never fully established, being only idealtypes, and have to be taken therefore more as how the state should be than what the states are.
These nuanced considerations precise efficiently the framework mobilised by the author to draw his reflection and conclusions. In particular, his functional understanding of statehood, taking some distance from the Weberian ideal-types of the state, enables him to nuance the notions of state capacity and failure, and to elaborate contrasted assessment for a single state. "Focusing on a functional understanding of statehood allows us to highlight cases where Arab states are strong (in the security function, and, in times of abundant rents, in the welfare function) and where they are weak (in the representation function and, in terms of fiscal crisis, in the welfare function)" (p.18), and to conclude, especially for the Arab world, that " states do not have to be powerful to survive ". This point reinforces his main argument according to which " (r)entierism has produced the twin phenomena of weak states and life support for weak and fragile states "(p.6). However, despite a very interesting deconstruction of the various main conceptions relating to state and statehood, and despite his attempts to emancipate from classic, rigid and narrow ones, the author finally proposes an understanding of state and statehood which remains quite conventional. He uses a quite classic and functionalist frame which presents limited explanatory capacities. This is the main weakness of the demonstration. Founded on a definition of the state which can easily be criticised for its lack of historical and functional relevance, the whole demonstration according to which Arab states are weak, failed of failing cannot stand solidly.
Indeed, the definition of the modern state retained by the author and underlying the whole demonstration assumes that the state is "best captured in terms of the three core functions of any modern state: security, welfare and representation" (p.1). Consequently, measuring its strength and efficiency corresponds to assess its role as security and welfare provider as well as its representativity. "Its basic functions are the provision of internal and external security, of representation and legitimacy, and of welfare and wealth ". As a consequence, assessing its failure equates to consider "the failure of good governance, in the security field, the failure to provide protection and stability equally to all citizens in a non discriminatory way, and in the economic domain the failure to provide welfare -the latter being the most important in the long term" (p.114). However, these approach and definiton of the state (and consequently of its failure) draw the definition of a particular variant modern state. In other words, the alleged characteristics of the modern state as defined by the author are actually the characteristics of one possible configuration of the modern state, or regime. They are exactly the core features of the modern liberal democracy. The resulting confusion whether we assess the modern character, or more specifically the liberal character of the Arab state, is particularly obvious in the following statement: "While there might be nuanced disagreements as to whether representation is equally fulfilled only in liberal democracies or also within other political systems, the real nexus lies in how individual rights, civil rights, citizenships laws and minority rights are guaranteed within a state" (p. 16).
Assessing the modern state, or one of its variant within the internal political model chosen, is much more than a nuance, and it transforms totally the conclusion regarding the alleged failure of Arab states as modern states, or even as states. The whole author's demonstration becomes finally the demonstration that the Arab states are not liberal ones, which is a quite consensual diagnosis, and not if they are on the path of modern state formation or if they can be considered as efficient states. Actually, in the genealogy of the modern state, i.e. the one which emerged at the end of the Middle Ages and following modern period (15th-16th-17th centuries), the modern state is first of all a state which is able to regulate violence within its borders and its ability to build a centralized and rational institutional system (Devetak, 1995, pp. 193-197) .
Its representative dimension came much later than its emergence as a modern state, and its institutional consolidation, more particularly since the American revolution of independence and the French revolution which spread its ideals of democracy and self-determination to the rest of Europe. The other alleged core constitutive aspect, which is welfare, can also be highly questioned as an essential feature of state modernity, as it appeared and was achieved in some modern states even later than the values of democracy and representative legitimacy, more especially after the industrial revolutions that occurred in the mid and late 19th century in Europe, which gave rise to a massive proletariat which struggled for social equity and solidarity. This is only in the mid-20th century that a true welfare system was established in some Western states, but this dimension is only one possible politicaleconomic system followed by modern states, as one can judge according to the numerous state ideologies that recommend the necessity of a lean state to foster economic competitivity, as well as the fact that welfare state is not the model chosen by numerous Western modern states, and has even began to be dismantled in the leading well-known western states, under the pressure of neo-liberal policies these last decades.
When it comes to security fullfilment, another limit can also be stressed, as the author focuses particularly on human security. "State failure is the failure of good governance, in the security field the failure to provide protection and stability equally to all citizens in a non discriminatory way, and in the economic domain the failure to provide welfare -the latter being the most important in the long term" (p.114). However, before the achievement of the liberal state, human security was far from being the core concern of the state (pre-modern and modern ones), the state being the only subject of security in the policies it designed (leading to massive human right abuses), as will be dealt with later. However, in his conclusive chapter, p.112, he stresses very relevantly the current inversed process of state making: whereas in the past, the modern state evolved from a strong state to a liberal one, today's policies seek to reinforce the state through democratizing it and enforcing liberal policies, which may explain the current difficulties in the process of state making. It could have been very fruitful to explore that approach, which is only slightly evoked. This is why the definition chosen to define the modern state seems to be quite normative, substantialist and ethno-centered.
Patterns of Comparison between Early Modern
European State and Conremporary Arab State.
The comparison between the formation of European modern states and current Arab ones offers numerous and interesting reflections that suggest the notion that this is the book's key significant feature. The assumptaion presented by the author that the radical transformations of the international system can be considered as a valuable assumption explaining the differences between both phenomena, and the alleged failure in the formation of a well consildated and strong Arab states. In the early modern period, domestic taxation could be efficiently managed and the power of the state was exercised within the borders of its territory and over a given population because the latter was more easily submitted to the central state power. Currently, on the contrary, the erosion of state borders and increased people mobility beyond specific states complicates the process and efficiency of taxation, as well as exclusive stato-national allegiances. "The growing importance of economic globalization and the apparent restraints this imposes on the behaviour of states seems to provide a quite different context of state building compared with that in early modern Europe" (p.23).
The vision of the retreat of the state assumed by the author can be contested due to phenomena of state resilience and adaptations, and to states' connection with a huge spectrum of private actors, which actually constitute a continuity of state authority and strategy. Yet, it remains true that the deep transformations occured on the global scene, resulting from globalization, have necessarily impacted the domestic political configurations. However, despite the focus on the pressure of globalization on current state configurations, as well as the alleged primacy of rational interests in the definition of culture, the book seems to be embedded in a kind of orientalist dichotomy between East and West. Orientalism is defined by its main theorist Edward Said as a trend of thought which, through history and various disciplines, has conceived and represented the Orient as the inversed mirror of the Occident, lacking nuances and true deep knowledge of the different local and distinct societies. It also describes oriental societies, and particularly Arab-Muslim ones, as hermetic to modernity. The State making in the Middle East is definitely not a book driven by neo-imperialist ends (contrary to the relating core trend of orientalism denounced by Said), as stated particularly in the epilogue. Indeed, in the last subpart dealing with the challenges and possible outcomes of the Arab Spring, to the question "What the West can do?", the author recommends to "the West (Europe and the United States)" not to intervene in another way than the one of accompanying subtly the democratization efforts, and leaving the Arab societies deal with the endogenous issues which triggered the upraisals in a sovereign way. The book is nevertheless framed in concepts such as weak, failed and failing state derived from a Western-dominated epistemic community of state failure and connected to a transformational agenda in political, economic and social fields.
The systematic dichotomy between Western and Eastern experiences of the state suggests that the author is somehow influenced by orientalist biases, and that research on Arab Middle East has not totally shifted towards post-colonial approaches.The preconceived archetype according to which Eastern societies are fundamentally similar to one other, and fundamentaly and antithetically dissimilar to western societies, stressed by Edward Said (Said,1977.pp.43-127) and reflecting orientalist biases, is subtly noticeable in the book. "Wars can have formative and organizing effects, as in early modern Europe, but also desintegrative or reformative effects, as in the Middle East»; "In the Middle East, unlike in Europe, wars did not make states -they destroyed them";" Middle eastern states stand in contrast to the authentically sovereign states that emerged in early modern Europe ". The common analysis and diagnostic for all the Arab states provides finally no real and differentiated analysis taking into account the specificity of each state. Despite some nuances between states aknowleged by the author, the designation and diagnosis of the Arab states conveys the idea of a homogenerous political block, from Morocco to the Gulf, with some minor different characteristics. "How can one explain the persistance of current Arab regimes, given the weakness and fragility of the state? ".
The category that the author uses to refer to the region, the Middle East, or in some other part " Arab Middle East ", is conceived as a political category. "Middle East including all the Arab states as a political category". This label is usually a political-geographical one focusing on countries including, if we only talk about Arab states, the Gulf and often the Mashrek, but not North Africa. This conveys the idea that all the Arab states belong to a same and common region, and facilitates their inclusion in the same political analysis. There are indeed more common points, or at least less differences, between early modern Europe and the current Arab world than aknowledged in the book; first because the analysis relating to the modern state formation in early modern Europe presents some weaknesses and inaccuracies, which is also the case in the analysis of the contemporary Arab world.
The analysis retained to describe the modern state which emerged in Europe at the end of the Middle Ages, as well as the logics and dynamics of its emergence, is essential since it constitutes the core line of reference and comparison for the Arab states. As we have seen earlier, the definition retained to define the modern state which emerged at that period in Europe is functionalist, and refers to the alledged core function of the modern state: security, welfare and representativity. However, the modern states which emerge in the 14th and 15th centuries and further consolidate, centralize and bureaucratize their administration all along the following centuries, are far from corresponding to the central definition of the modern state provided by Schwarz to assess the Arab world. Except the fact that these states could progressively acquire and monopolize the means and legitimacy for violence (internal and external), the welfare function came much later (19th and most importantly 20th century, and for only a few of them), and after the claims for representativity which rose during the enlightment period (second half of the 17th century) and really modified the internal functioning of the states towards more representativity and democracy starting from the 17thth century in England (bill of rights of 1689), end of the 18th century for the US and for France. The principles of democracy and people's self determination spread in Europe with the large scale wars led by Napoleon who, by the way, put an end to the democratic and revolutionary experience in France (Thomson, 1957, pp.24-158) . The 19th was characterised by both internal conflicts and revolutions for democratization, as well as interstate conflicts to foster or prevent other societies to achieve democratization (Ayoob, 2001, pp.127-140) . Besides, even in the countries which reached a beginning of state of right and democratic systems, it remained till the 20th century imperfect and limited representative system (only specific social classes could vote with the censitary suffrage, only males till the mid-20th century, no Afro-Americans in the US till 1968, and no local populations could vote and be represented in the whole colonial empires for the colonial powers). This considerably weakens the vision of western states as old liberal ones. They have reached modernity several centuries ago, but not the liberal way of functioning. Modernity for states is more relevantly equated to institutionalization, centralization of power and monopoly on the means of legitimate violence, as aknowleged by the author in some statements (p.3), "state making is thus closely linked to the processes of bureaucratization, revenue accumulation, and centralization of the state", and p.22 "state making can be defined as those processes that lead to the centralisation of polical power as well over a well-defined continuous territory, with a monopoly of the means of coercion", but he actually shifted towards a definition of the liberal state, which is different and specific, without justifying the shift in the definition.
The presentation of the logics of war during leading to early European modernity are not totally accurate. The authors emphasises the role of external wars, waged for territorial motives and expansion or defence of power, and the fact that the states appear with modernity as "truly sovereign ones" ("Middle eastern states stand in contrast to the authentically sovereign states that emerged in early modern Europe" (p.4)). This misses all the internal wars, opposing the king to other lords, which at the end of the middle ages and beginning of modernity were continual, in a context where the actual strength and legitimacy of each actor was not consolidated and favorable to the king. Moreover, stating that the early modern states waged war for territorial state interests mostly misses the wars waged for dynastic interests and opposing various kings in Europe. Emphasising this latter aspect would have stressed the primacy of the defence and consolidation of personal power of the rulers, before the the one of state interest, which were equated slowly with the consolidation of the modern state. Tilly, in his theory on the formation of the modern state, insists on that aspect, underlining the fact that the modern state emerged as an unintended result of these interpersonal wars waged for personal power which resulted in a centralisation and consolidation of power, giving rise to the modern, central and bureaucratic state (Ayoob,2001,pp.127-140) . Tilly argued that "The continuum (of the emergence of the modern state) ran from bandit and pirates to king via tax collection, regional power holders and professional soldiers. The uncertain, elastic line between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" violence appeared in the upper reaches of power. Early in the state making process, many parties shared the right to use violence "
. (Tilly, 1985, pp.170-185) .
To conclude on the comparison patterns' weaknesses used by the author, the confusion between the notions of state-building and state-formation, taken and used as synonyms by the author can be highlighted also. One concept only is defined, and partially, which is "state making", corresponding to the core reflection and object of the book. "State making can be defined as those processes that lead to the centralisation of polical power as well over a well-defined continuous territory, with a monopoly of the means of coercion" (p.22). However, the author also mobilizes the concept of state building, without defining it in distinction with " state making ". It creates the impression that both concepts refer to the same process and that several processes described actually refer excusively to state building, but are referred to as state making, and inversely, as will be highlighted later.
Yet, the two concepts refer to two totally distinct processes and logics, calling thus for different analytical frames. The notions of state making or state formation refer to very long term processes, resulting from a wide range of factors and logics, relating to different actors and scales but which result in the formation of the state (Ayoob, 2001, pp.128-130) . It means that the process of state making/formation is not a rational, conscious and designed one, and that its results are not intended ones, the formation of the state being partly an externality of the combination of different processes and logics. As stated by Tilly and stresed the state formation process in early modern Europe was not a teleological one (Ayoob.2001, pp.128-133) . The modern state ermergence resulted from the violent interactions between state (the King) and non state actors (the lords) -which could not be easily distinguished in the Middle Ages, both in terms of material capacities and local political social legitimacy-and their struggle in the conquest of the monopoly on organized and then legitimate violence. By no means the final result which is the formation of the modern state can be considered as the ultimate goal of the belligerents.
Distinctively, state-building refers to a policy and political strategy (thus rather rational and conscious, seeking to adapt specific means according to a specific aim) conceived and led by different policy-makers and decision makers (of different kinds, whether indigenous ones or a coalition of external powers in contemporary peace-making operations), in order to build and consolidate state institutions and create a stable and efficient state of a certain kind (Ayoob,2001,pp.128-131) . Several statements in the book (as well as the absence of distinct definitions for the two notions) maintain a rather blur conception of the two processes; it seems however that whereas the actual notion of state-making is applied to the European processes of state making, this is the actual notion of state-building which is applied to assess the contemporary Arab states (despite the fact that lexically, this is the notion of « state-making » which is applied). Several statement are explicit of that unclear and confuse use, by mobilizing one concept instead of the other, despite of an obvious incompatibility and incoherence. For instance, p.34, talking of Iraq and its efforts to build institutions, the author states: "By 1929, the process of state making had nevertheless advanced ". Clearly, the true sense and relating notion to be used was "state-building" and not "state-making", first because no precise date -and so early in the phase of sovereignty and independence obtention-can be connected with a longterm and deep rooted and no clearly visible process such as state making; and second because the author wrote that statement in a context of description of the paths followed by the political elite when it had to build the new Iraqi state. The same confusion is noticeable in following statement: "In terms of popular representation, state making took place initially against the will of the country's two largest sociocultural groups, the Kurds and the Shiites (...). State institution were established in a way that paid little consideration to the heterogeneity of the Iraqi society" (p.35). Here again, it is clearly visible that state-building concrete and voluntary policies are considered, regarding the orientation and configuration of institution building, and not state-making more broadly, which is confirmed by the follwing sentence wich came as a relating conclusive point: "Only since 2003 has the sectarian logic received greater attention, but it has not facilitated the still difficult process of state reconstruction" (p.35). Again, p.36, we find such a confusion, with two very different processes compared as if the same was being considered and compared: whereas it is obviously state-building which is considered for Iraq, it is compared to European state making ("militant nationalism in the early years of state making, the struggle to establish parliamentary institutions, and acts of outright repression against ethnic minorities demonstrated that Iraq's very creation as a modern state involved several elements that were also characteristic of state formation in early modern Europe "). The same occur p.126 for Jordan, or p.92 for Gulf countries ("state making was characterized by the redistribution of existing oil revenue" -this statement was clearly referring to a certain political strategy and organization). Such a conceptual confusion distorts and invalidates several dimensions of the comparison between the formation of the modern state in early Europe and the current one in the Arab world, as the comparison for each period and areas does not consider the same process.
Alternative Approaches in Dealing with the Arab
States.
In the frame of the aforementioned discussion, an alternative light can be shed upon the experience of state making of the Arab states particularly on the specific case studies developed in the book (Iraq, Jordan, the UAE), and, more broadly, on the whole Arab world.
The author advocacy that the state is less "modern" than in Europe can be considered valid, if we stick to Weber's definition of modernity associating it (in the case of the state) to a high level of rationalisation, centralization, bureaucratisation and institutionalisation. It can be acknowledged that the states that emerged in the Arab world have developed, in varying degrees, an incomplete and not always efficient bureaucracy and that the institutionalisation of power is combined with more traditional ways to manage and distribute power (Gulf states for instance), or with patronage and clientelism logics which go along or independently from kinship and clan, including different group interests. These configurations can be patrimonial or neo-patrimonial. It can be also aknowledged that the absence of liberal states (the definition of the liberal state being provided by the author to define the modern one) in the whole area, and that the alleged democratization processes initiated by certain states (especially prior to the Arab Spring) were driven particularly to comply with international pressures or recommendations, but have not resulted in a true opening domestically. However, a few substantial nuances can be provided, leading to a different interpretation of the processes of state building in the Arab world.
First of all, there was a true and substantial shift from traditionalism towards modernity through the struggle for independence and the policies of state-builiding led by the then political elites, and continued by the following generations. The current Arab societies and sociopolitical elites are deeply different from the ones preceding independence. In most cases, the political elite which led the struggle for independence and established the post-independence state did it against the old traditional elites, in a more or less conflicting way. The structure of social and political power is radically different than the one which prevailed 70 years ago. Most of the social and political elites ruling the states have been pure products of modernisation, from the education system that preceded the independence and developed later, especially in the aftermath of independence. They studied abroad, travelled, were politically involved in ideological parties developping a modernist and socialist vision of the state, and contributed to reinforce laic and supra-confessional parties, as well as the state in order to transform and modernize the society (with the exception of the Gulf). The role of the Western values and political norms had a great influence in that trend, as the new elite studies in the metropole or schools managed by the colonial power, as well as the materialist socialist ideologies that spread in the Third world during the cold war, in the context of struggle for independence, for development, and under the banner of the former Soviet Union. This led to the retreat and loss of influence and power of the traditional elites, religious or community ones, as well as to their reconfiguration. With the rural exodus, in the favor of the development of bureaucracy, education and military, which were the first institutions hiring manpower, this increased the disconnection between traditional leaders and the new generations. If modernity is defined in opposition to tradition (the modern European state being understood in opposition to the Middle ages traditional feudal one), then the Arab states do have shifted towards modernity. This does not imply that traditional elites and kinship lost relevance in the Arab world (solidarity ties based on kinship increase in contexts of economic crises, the new modern leadership may seek legitimation towards traditional elite when politically challenged, there are phenomena of patronage linked with the origin and community to secure the power). However, this does not cancel the institutionalisation and bureaucratisation which occurred in a very short time considering the very young age of the Arab states; this does not cancel the fact that traditional power was deeply challenged and shifted towards rationalisation of policies and power; paradoxically, the recourse to kinship served the consolidation of the state in many cases when internal and external challenge to power were too high, as stressed by Hinnebusch in the case of Syria for instance (Hinnebusch, 2002,pp.141-163) . The characterization of these states as precarious ones (and thus resilient) seems to be more relevant in several cases. Several times, decisions were clearly taken by the political leadership in the name of rational state interest, even in contradiction with the interest of specific classes or communities traditionally in their network of interest (for instance, land-reform, privatization to redistribute it, and for welfare state). In the same vein and in most cases, traditional local leadership (sheikh) could contrinue, in case of state challenge, to constitute a continuity of power in specific areas, transforming also themselves into elements of the state and being involved in the processes of elections, seeking an political and institutional role within the state.
The role of the military and of wars, in the consolidation of the state, cannot be considered too briefly, as it led to strong national cohesion within countries whose societies were too fragmented and did not experience any common concrete political experience, under the Ottoman's rule or Western one (clearly the case for Syria and Palestine for example). It created a national cohesion, and the military career a way to dedicate one's involvement to the state (in several states, the military was a very attractive career, which does not only demonstrate the attraction towards a materially sustanaible career, but also national ideals, and even if it was not initially for national ideals, the socialisation and ideologization within the army created and strengthened the national feeling. Through its wars against Israel, Syria could increase its military power, mass incorporating within the army and state bureaucracy, professionalize it and rationalise it. (Hinnebusch, 2002, pp.141-163) . Beside, focusing on state rentierism as a static and passive source of money misses the logics of power and strategies lying behind, and founded on an efficient state structure. Indeed, the rent alone could not have maintained these states, it necessitated rational policies of captation of several resource, and efficient formal and unformal diplomacy, etc (especially for the rent which does not result from oil or gas revenue). It also required to be able to build an administration able to redistribute it and to develop an efficient welfare state.
The recent events linked with the Arab spring have stressed several elements, but not necessarily the failure or weakness of the state. It would have been relevant in the book to distinguish between state and regime. The regime maybe in crisis, but not the state, meaning that part of the population rejected the way of ruling, non democratic and repressive, as well the political leadership, but the state is present in most of the parts. It may have stressed also difficulty to cope with the economic and financial crisis (like the effects of the adjustments program, aggravated by the international financial and economic crisis of 2008), which is an issue in the Western states too. After the ousting of Ben Ali, institutions in Tunisia continued to work, and the continuity of the state was assured; in Syria also the main state institutions remain efficient after almost three years of civil conflict. In Iraq, this is the profound and systematic debathification which led to the implosion of the state and the chaotic situation that exist today, as it completely dismantled the state institution which allowed the implementation of the central state policies, revealing that they were functional till 2003, despite the embargo and the decrease of the state power. This is why it matters to consider the Arab states on the very long term, without concluding radically to the failure of the state. It is also important to think in terms of power(internal or external) and resilience, keeping however a distinct approach for each state, as more than ever, it appears as impossible and generalize any theory and rule for the whole Arab world. The trend in social science is increasingly differentiating the respective experience of the Arab states, rather than leading to a convergent analysis for the whole Arab world. Indeed, a research seeking to develop a deep and nuanced analysis cannot but notice several exceptions for each consideration, meaning that the Arab states too different in terms of internal logics of power, despite some common issues. This is why the Arab spring is far from having had same manifestation and consequences according to the countries.
